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An essential ingredient in models of career concerns is ex ante uncertainty about an
agent’s type. This paper shows how career concerns can arise even in the absence of any
such ex ante uncertainty, if the unobservable actions that an agent takes influence his future
productivity. By implementing effort in mixed strategies the principal can endogenously
induce uncertainty about the agent’s ex post productivity and generate reputational in-
centives. Our main result is that creating such ambiguity can be optimal for the principal,
even though this exposes the agent to additional risk and reduces output. This finding
demonstrates the importance of mixed strategies in contracting environments with im-
perfect commitment, which contrasts with standard agency models where implementing
mixed strategy actions typically is not optimal if pure strategies are also implementable.
JEL classification: D80, J33, L14, M12
Keywords: incentive contracts, reputation, mixed strategies
∗This paper benefited from helpful comments from Jacques Cre´mer, Uli Hege, Bruno Jullien, Wolfgang
Ko¨hler, Albrecht Morgenstern, Georg No¨ldeke, Fre´de´ric Palomino, Patrick Rey, Bernard Salanie´, Burkhard
Schipper, and Patrick Schmitz. Moreover, we thank two anonymous referees for their comments, which helped
to significantly improve the paper.
†Royal Holloway, University of London, Dept. of Economics, Egham TW20 0EX, United Kingdom. Tel.:
+44 1784 44 33 09, E-mail: Alexander.Koch@rhul.ac.uk.
‡HEC, De´p. Fin. et Econ., 1 rue de la Libe´ration, F-78351 Jouy en Josas Cedex, France. Tel.: +33 139 67
72 95, E-mail: peyrache@hec.fr.
1
1 Introduction
To a large extent incentives in organizations arise both from workers’ career concerns and
from explicit incentive schemes. The seminal paper of Holmstro¨m (1982/99) shows that, in
the absence of any explicit monetary rewards, a worker faced with a labor market that tries
to infer his ability from observations of his past performance has an incentive to provide some
effort to influence this updating process. An essential ingredient in extant models of such
career concerns is the existence of some ex ante uncertainty about a worker’s type (e.g., see
Borland (1992)). Gibbons and Murphy (1992) show for such a setting that the combination
of career concerns and explicit contracting does not affect the insurance versus incentives
trade-off from pure explicit incentives models. Implicit incentives from career concerns are
simply a substitute for explicit incentives. Therefore, as in pure explicit incentives models, the
firm can only increase expected output at the cost of exposing the worker to more risk and
thereby increasing the effort implementation cost. In other words, the intuitions gained from
the analysis of single-agent incentive problems seem to carry over to dynamic settings with
career concerns.
This paper shows that the above conclusion may not hold in situations with on-the-job human
capital acquisition: the firm may optimally choose to strengthen incentives by exposing a
risk averse worker to additional risk from uncertainty about his ability and thereby reduce
his expected output. Moreover, we demonstrate that because the worker’s actions affect his
future productivity through learning by doing, reputational incentives can arise endogenously:
starting from a situation with no ex ante uncertainty about the worker’s ability, the firm
may optimally design the explicit incentive contract to deliberately create such uncertainty
ex post. The key difference to the setting with ex ante uncertainty about a worker’s ability
is that the market uses output to infer what action the worker has taken (the action affects
future productivity through learning by doing and output is not directly informative about
productive human capital) rather than using output as a signal of ability (from which the
signal-jamming effect of effort needs to be filtered out).
We derive our results in a simple two-period model of human capital acquisition that can
serve as a building block in richer settings. In the first period, a principal contracts with an
agent, whose productivity is common knowledge, to induce unobservable effort through a spot
contract. The agent’s effort not only stochastically increases observable output but, through
learning by doing, also deterministically raises the agent’s unobservable human capital at the
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end of the first period. For simplicity, in the second period there is no effort decision and
production depends only on the agent’s human capital. The principal competes with other
potential employers, who all update their estimates about the agent’s human capital based on
the contract signed and the output produced in the prior contractual relation.
The main argument in the paper can be summarized as follows. Suppose first that the princi-
pal’s contract induces pure strategy effort in equilibrium. Then the agent acquires high human
capital through learning by doing with probability one. The market observes the contract of
the agent and therefore is certain that he has high human capital, regardless of the first-period
output. This leads to a high second-period wage which does not depend on first-period output.
Suppose now that the principal’s contract induces the agent to exert effort only with proba-
bility smaller than one. High first-period output is evidence that the agent actually exerted
effort and acquired high human capital, leading to a high second-period wage. In contrast,
when observing low first-period output the market cannot be sure whether the agent did or
did not exert effort and it assigns some probability to the agent having low human capital.
Hence, Bayesian updating by the market leads to a low second-period wage. This creates a
wedge between the second-period wage of a successful and of an unsuccessful agent, which
provides reputational incentives in the first period. As a consequence, the first-period explicit
compensation for high output can be lower than when pure strategy effort is implemented.
First, less effort is demanded. Second, the agent has an additional incentive to exert effort to
receive a higher second-period wage. Implementing mixed strategy effort is optimal for the
principal if the gain from reduced pay outweighs the expected loss in output due to the lower
probability of effort provision.
We show that, for the case of a risk-neutral or risk-averse agent, limited liability of the agent is
a necessary condition for mixed strategy implementation. Explicit incentives work through the
wedge in first-period compensation following high or low output. Since limited liability puts
a downward constraint on the level of compensation, the agent earns a rent from the effect
of learning by doing on general human capital. Mixed-strategy implementation removes part
of this rent in the event of low first-period output and creates reputational incentives which
decrease the firm’s implementation cost. Absent limited liability the principal can directly
lower the level of compensation when implementing pure strategy effort instead of distorting
the effort decision. This is optimal with a risk-neutral agent – maximizing output net of the
effort cost maximizes the joint surplus – and with a risk-averse agent – the agent is exposed
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to less risk and expected output is increased. Therefore, limited liability has an effect on
incentive provision quite different from that of risk-aversion – which contrasts with standard
principal-agent models (e.g., see Laffont and Martimort (2002)).
Extensions of the base model to a pure career concerns setting without explicit contracts and
to a setting where the market does not observe contracts are considered. Moreover, we apply
the model to analyze how much focus on specific tasks contracts should mandate. Because
reputational incentives are affected by an agent’s focus, it may be optimal for the principal to
be vague on the type of task that the agent should pursue. In addition, we address the issue
of optimal screening of job applicants. In a setting where a perfect screening technology is
costless we derive conditions under which a principal optimally refrains from fully screening
heterogeneous job applicants.
Related literature
In agency models it is typically not optimal for the principal to induce agents to play a mixed
strategy if a pure strategy can be implemented.1 However, several papers on contracting
under asymmetric information demonstrate that mixed strategies can be optimal when a
contractual incompleteness prevents the dynamic contracting problem from collapsing to one
that is essentially static. Laffont and Tirole (1988) produce such a result in a setting where a
principal with limited commitment power repeatedly contracts with the same agent to create
incentives in a moral hazard problem. Contracting is complicated by a ratchet effect2, and
this induces the principal to implement mixed strategies for agents rather than fully revealing
pure strategies. Bester and Strausz (2001) extend the revelation mechanism to account for
imperfect commitment powers of the mechanism designer and show that, under an optimal
mechanism, the agent does not reveal his type with certainty. Our results demonstrate that,
even when principal and agent contract under symmetric information about the type of the
agent, implementation of a mixed rather than a pure strategy can be optimal.
Our paper is also related to Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999a) who show that, in the
context of Holmstro¨m (1982/99)’s model of pure career concerns, reputational incentives can
increase as the signal structure becomes coarser. Similar results obtain when the design of
1There exists several papers in which the principal can only implement mixed strategies (e.g., Fudenberg
and Tirole (1990) or Khalil (1997)).
2If the agent reveals that he is a low cost type he will face a tougher incentive scheme in the next period
than if he reveals to be a high cost type.
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explicit incentives interact with career concerns (Koch and Peyrache (2005a, 2005b)) or with
ratchet effects (Meyer and Vickers 1997, Auriol, Friebel, and Pechlivanos 2002). A new con-
tribution of our paper is that it shows how a principal can design explicit incentive schemes
to create reputational incentives through ambiguity about an agent’s future productive value,
even when agents are ex ante homogeneous. The picture that emerges from this literature is
that explicit and implicit incentives often affect each other in more complicated ways than just
being substitutes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. The limited liability case is
then analyzed in Section 3. Section 4 treats the case with unlimited liability. In Section 5 we
discuss the robustness of our findings and illustrate how the base model can be reinterpreted
and applied to a multi-task setting as well as to determine the optimal amount of screening of
job applicants. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
We consider a two-period model. In the first period, an employee (the agent), whose ability is
common knowledge, contracts with a risk-neutral firm (the principal) over the production of
output y˜ ∈ {y, y¯}. In the absence of effort (e=0), the agent produces y with probability one
and accumulates human capital H. By exerting unobservable effort e=1 at private cost ψ, he
produces y¯ ≡ y + ∆ y with probability pi ∈ (0, 1) and y with probability 1 − pi. In addition,
he then acquires human capital H¯ ≡ H + ∆H. A fraction α of this human capital is firm
specific, whereas the rest is general. If he does not accept the job the agent faces an outside
option that offers a life-time utility of zero.
Neither the agent’s effort nor his human capital are observed. However, the contract signed
with the agent is publicly observable, and at the end of the first period all the parties (the
agent, the principal and other potential employers) get to know the agent’s level of output3.
For simplicity, in the second period there is no effort decision and production depends only on
the agent’s human capital. As a consequence, in the second period, the first principal (“the
incumbent” denoted by I) competes a` la Bertrand with other principals for the agent under
symmetric information. If the agent stays with principal I, he produces output equal to the
level of total human capital H accumulated in the first period. In contrast, when switching
3For an analysis where the principal can decide on what type of performance information to reveal to the
market and the repercussions that this has on the design of incentive schemes see Koch and Peyrache (2005b).
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to a new principal, the agent can only produce (1− α)H. Thus, it is straightforward that in
the equilibrium of the second-period continuation game, the agent stays with principal I, who
matches outside offers. That is, the agent earns a second-period wage t2 equal to his expected
general human capital conditional on the contract and on realized output in the first period:4
t2(y˜) = (1− α)E [H|y˜1, contract] . (1)
As is standard in models of career concerns, we assume that principal I can only offer the
agent a contract that makes first-period transfers t1 contingent on output in that period (spot
contract).5 That is, the contract offered is a wage pair c =
[
t1
(
y
)
, t1 (y¯)
]
.
The agent is assumed to be risk-neutral or risk averse with preferences represented by the
following time-separable utility function over first- and second-period transfers:
U(e, y˜) = u(t1(y˜)) + u(t2(y˜))− e · ψ, (2)
where u : IR→ IR, u(0) = 0, u′ > 0 and u′′ ≤ 0. Finally, let g ≡ u−1.
To summarize, the timing of the game is as follows. Principal I offers an (observable) contract
c =
[
t1
(
y
)
, t1 (y¯)
]
. Each possible contract c induces a subgame in which the agent first chooses
to accept or refuse the contract and then, if he accepts, selects a (mixed) strategy p ∈ [0, 1].
Nature then realizes the (unobservable) effort e ∈ {0, 1} and the (observable) output y˜ ∈ {y, y¯}.
The second-period labor market ensues. The principal I and other principals simultaneously
make wage offers among which the agent selects the maximum offer.
3 Limited liability
We first solve for perfect Bayesian equilibria assuming that the agent is protected by limited
liability, i.e., tτ ≥ 0, τ = 1, 2. We start by considering candidate equilibria where the contract
implements pure strategy effort and where the contract implements a mixed strategy p ∈ (0, 1).
We then prove that each contractual offer by principal I induces a subgame with a unique
continuation equilibrium. Therefore, the design of contract in the first stage reduces to a
4Our results go through under any formulation in which the second-period rent accruing to the agent is
increasing in his expected human capital.
5Typically, in labor markets parties lack full pre-commitment power (e.g., workers cannot cede their right to
revoke a contract because slavery is forbidden). If the parties had such powers the dynamic incentive problem
would essentially collapse to a static one in which reputational incentives do not matter.
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straightforward maximization problem using the payoffs from the candidate equilibria initially
considered.
3.1 Implementing effort in pure strategies
Consider the contract c that implements effort at the lowest cost in the static incentive problem
corresponding to the first-period in our model. It involves first-period wages that induce first-
period utilities u¯c1 ≡ u(tc1(y¯)) and uc1 ≡ u(tc1(y)) which satisfy the following static incentive and
individual rationality constraints:
pi u¯c1 + (1− pi)uc1 − ψ ≥ uc1, (3)
pi u¯c1 + (1− pi)uc1 − ψ ≥ 0. (4)
The incentive constraint is binding. Moreover, the individual rationality constraint binds
without violating limited liability since u(0) = 0. First-period utilities uc1 = 0 and u¯
c
1 =
ψ
pi
are achieved by transfers tP = g (uc1) = 0 and t¯
P = g (u¯c1) = g
(
ψ
pi
)
. The superscript P
refers to pure strategy implementation, and is used later in comparisons with mixed strategy
implementation, carrying superscript M .
Suppose that by offering contract c the principal I induces a subgame where market beliefs are
that the agent exerts effort with probability one in the first period, leading to second-period
utilities
uP2 ≡ u(t2(y¯)) = u(t2(y)) = u
(
(1− α) H¯) . (5)
If the agent correctly anticipates this when taking his effort decision the incentive and indi-
vidual rationality constraints are:
pi u¯c1 + (1− pi)uc1 − ψ + uP2 ≥ uc1 + uP2 , (IC:P)
pi u¯c1 + (1− pi)uc1 − ψ + uP2 ≥ 0, (IR:P)
The second-period utility is constant so (IC:P) is equivalent to the static incentive constraint
and binds. However, the individual rationality constraint (IR:P) is slack because uP2 > 0. In
fact, limited liability prevents reducing t1
(
y
)
below zero, so (IR:P) cannot bind when (IC:P)
is satisfied.
Under contract c =
[
tP = 0, t¯P = g
(
ψ
pi
)]
the principal’s expected profit in the subgame equi-
librium is:
ΠP = y + pi
[
∆ y − g
(
ψ
pi
)]
+ αH¯. (6)
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Since pure strategy implementation will be our benchmark case we assume that the gain in
output for the principal, ∆ y, exceeds the monetary transfer to the agent that is necessary to
induce pure strategy effort, g
(
ψ
pi
)
:
Assumption 1 ∆ y > g
(
ψ
pi
)
.
3.2 Implementing effort in mixed strategies
Suppose now that in the subgame induced by some contract c the market’s beliefs are that the
agent exerts effort with probability p and no effort otherwise. Then, the market’s expectation
of the agent’s level of human capital becomes a function of the first-period output y˜. Correctly
anticipating these beliefs, the agent faces one of the following second-period utilities, depending
on the realized output:
u¯M2 ≡ u(tM2 (y¯)) = u
(
(1− α) H¯) , (7)
uM2 (p) ≡ u(tM2 (y)) = u
(
(1− α)
[
H +
p (1− pi)
1− p pi ∆H
])
. (8)
Note that the dependence on p was dropped for the function that is constant in p to make the
exposition clearer. Given these beliefs, to indeed implement mixed strategy p the contract c
must be incentive compatible, i.e., satisfy
pi
(
u¯c1(p) + u¯
M
2
)
+ (1− pi) (uc1 + uM2 (p))− ψ = uc1 + uM2 (p). (IC:M)
This incentive constraint implies that the individual rationality constraint,
uc1 + u
M
2 (p) ≥ 0, (IR:M)
is also satisfied. As before, the principal’s contract can set uc1 = 0 so that the limited liability
constraint binds and thus tM = g(0) = 0. From (IC:M) and the limited liability constraint we
then obtain
u¯c1(p) = max
{
ψ
pi
− (u¯M2 − uM2 (p)) , 0} . (9)
The required monetary transfers are lower than with pure strategy implementation: for all
p ∈ (0, 1) we have tM = tP = 0 and 0 ≤ t¯M (p) = g (u¯c1(p)) < t¯P . For our argument
it is sufficient to focus on the case where t¯M (p) = g
(
ψ
pi −
(
u¯M2 − uM2 (p)
))
does not violate
the limited liability constraint for any p ∈ (0, 1) and α ∈ (0, 1).6 Since u¯M2 ≤ u
(
H¯
)
and
6Note that this is the least favorable case for mixed strategy implementation. Hence, if here mixed strategy
implementation is optimal, a fortiori, it will be in the other case as well.
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uM2 (p) > u (H) for any p ∈ (0, 1) the following condition is sufficient to ensure that t¯M (p) > 0
for all possible values (α, p):
Assumption 2 ψpi ≥ u
(
H¯
)− u (H) .
The principal’s expected profit for such a contract implementing p ∈ (0, 1) is then given by:
ΠM (p) = y + p pi
[
∆ y − g (u¯M1 (p))]+ α [p H¯ + (1− p)H] . (10)
Our model incorporates on-the-job human capital acquisition. Therefore, whenever the market
cannot perfectly infer the agent’s effort level from the contract offered to the agent, it has to rely
on the realized output as a signal for the effort actually exerted. A high level of output indicates
that effort was exerted and that high human capital was acquired by the agent (cf. equation
(7)). In contrast, a low level of output is bad news about human capital since the market is no
longer certain that the agent exerted effort (cf. equation (8)). This creates a reputational wedge
u¯M2 − uM2 (p) that principal I can exploit to lower monetary transfers. Therefore, incentives
for effort arise even under rather low-powered monetary incentive schemes.
3.3 The optimal contract
The preceding sections focused on particular subgame equilibria. To characterize perfect
Bayesian equilibria of the overall game we proceed in two steps. First we show that each
subgame induced by a contract choice has a unique equilibrium. This then allows working
backwards to set up a well-defined maximization problem which determines the optimal con-
tract choice in the equilibrium of the overall game.
Lemma 1
Each contract choice c induces a subgame with a unique equilibrium.
The proof is relegated to the appendix. The result allows us to work backwards by first de-
termining the expected profit for principal I that each contract choice induces in the ensuing
subgame and then finding the optimal contract by simply maximizing the expected profit.
Among the contracts that induce pure strategy effort the one discussed in Section 3.1 offers
the maximum expected profit: for any other contract satisfying (IC:P) and (IR:P) the limited
liability constraint is slack. Similarly, for each mixed strategy p ∈ (0, 1) Section 3.2 character-
izes the profit maximizing contract. Hence, the maximization problem of principal I simplifies
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to a comparison of these contracts only. Her gain from implementing mixed strategy p ∈ (0, 1)
instead of pure strategy p = 1 is given by
G(p) ≡ ΠM (p)−ΠP = pi
[
g
(
ψ
pi
)
− p t¯M (p)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
saved implementation cost
− (1− p) [pi∆ y + α∆H] .︸ ︷︷ ︸
loss in expected output
(11)
The principal implements effort in mixed strategies whenever there exists a probability p ∈
(0, 1) such that the saved expected implementation cost outweighs the expected loss in output
relative to pure strategy effort. The following result gives a sufficient condition under which a
contract that implements a mixed strategy is optimal:
Proposition 1
Under limited liability of the agent, a sufficient condition for the equilibrium contract to involve
a mixed strategy p∗ ∈ (0, 1) is
pi
(
∆ y − g
(
ψ
pi
))
+ α∆H︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal loss in output for p ↑ 1
< pi(1− α)Z ∆H
1− pi︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal gain in cost reduction for p ↑ 1
(12)
where Z ≡ g′
(
ψ
pi
)
u′
(
(1− α) H¯).
Proof. Taking the derivative of G(p) with respect to p, we get
dG(p)
d p
= pi∆ y + α∆H (13)
− pi g (u¯M1 (p))− p pi g′ (u¯M1 (p)) u′((1− α) [H + p (1− pi)1− p pi ∆H
])
(1− α) 1− pi
(1− p pi)2 ∆H.
Given that G(0) = pi
(
g
(
ψ
pi
)
−∆ y
)
− α∆H < 0 (by Assumption 1) and G(1) = 0, a sufficient
condition for an interior solution is that dG(p)d p
∣∣∣
p=1
< 0.
The result demonstrates that moving towards less powerful monetary incentives can be benefi-
cial for the principal. The probability with which the agent is going to exert effort is determined
by the trade-off between inducing provision of effort in the first period and extracting rents
from the second period employment relation.
To understand the forces driving this trade-off, it is useful to first consider the comparative sta-
tics of condition (12). The larger the difference in first-period outputs ∆ y and the firm-specific
component of human capital α, the less likely that the principal implements mixed strategy ef-
fort. When α = 1, human capital is fully firm specific and the agent earns nothing in the second
period. Consequently, there are no reputational incentives because the agent’s second-period
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utility does not depend on first-period actions. Therefore, the optimal contract implements
pure strategy effort. The other polar case is when all the human capital is general, i.e., α = 0.
Then the impact of first-period actions on the agent’s second-period utility is maximal since he
earns the entire return to the human capital acquired in the first period. The condition for the
optimality of a mixed strategy contract becomes: ∆ y − g
(
ψ
pi
)
< g′
(
ψ
pi
)
u′
(
H¯
)
∆H
(1−pi) . Given
that u(·) and g(·) are increasing, clearly the set of values of ∆y that satisfy both Assumption
1 and condition (12) is non-empty. In contrast, the effect of an increase in the human capital
return to effort, ∆H, is ambiguous. An increase in ∆H unambiguously raises the expected
loss in firm-specific human capital that the principal incurs by not implementing pure strategy
effort. However, the magnitude of the cost saving is larger the lower the value of α and the less
risk averse the agent is. Therefore, for low firm-specific human capital α and low risk aversion,
mixed strategy implementation is more likely. Indeed, for α = 0 and u′′(·) = 0, an increase of
∆H has no effect on the marginal loss (left-hand side of (12))) but has a large positive effect
on the marginal gain in cost reduction (right-hand side of (12)). In contrast, for α = 1 the
cost saving effect is dominated and mixed strategy implementation becomes less likely.
In our framework, the agent earns a limited liability rent because the principal cannot make
him pay for the increase in future earnings due to accumulated human capital. This rent is
u
(
(1− α) H¯) in the case of pure strategy implementation and u((1− α) [H + p (1−pi)1−p pi ∆H])
in the case of mixed strategy implementation. Following our analysis above, optimal contracts
only involve mixed strategy effort if the limited liability rent is strictly positive, i.e., human
capital is not fully specific (α < 1). In such a setting, due to competition in the second-
period labor market, the agent captures part of the productivity gains from learning by doing
because limited liability prevents the principal from fully extracting rents in the first period.
Remarkably, Proposition 1 shows that, for appropriate values of the parameters, the principal
exposes a risk averse agent to more risk than in a static explicit incentive model: the lottery
over transfers faced by an agent under a contract that implements pure strategy effort (which
corresponds to the static moral hazard contract) first-order stochastically dominates the one
faced under a contract with mixed strategy effort. Such exposure to risk creates uncertainty
about the agent’s second-period productivity and generates reputational incentives that reduce
the limited liability rent. The uncertainty about the acquired human capital induced by mixed
strategy effort provision is a means to transform a homogeneous group of unexperienced agents
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into a heterogeneous group of experienced agents for whom reputational incentives exist.7
An interesting feature of Proposition 1 is that the principal faces a trade-off between the
riskiness of output and effort incentives, which to our knowledge is a new result in a model
with explicit incentives and risk averse agents.
While mixed strategy implementation may enhance the principal’s profit, it always reduces
welfare compared to pure strategy implementation. Overall, mixed strategy effort decreases
welfare by lowering the probability of high first-period output8 and reducing second-period
output because less human capital is accumulated. The principal can profitably create such
a distortion since, when implementing mixed strategies, she does not internalize the second-
period utility loss u
(
(1− α) H¯)− u((1− α) [H + p (1−pi)1−p pi ∆H]) that the agent is subject to
following a low state realization in the first period.
These results contrast with those obtained when one adds explicit contracts to the Holmstro¨m
(1982/99) career concerns setting. There, career concerns arise independent of the effort level
that the principal implements and therefore increase the equilibrium effort relative to the pure
explicit incentives case by lowering the monetary cost of providing incentives. In our setting,
there is an unambiguous drop in effort when the principal introduces career concerns.
4 Unlimited liability
In the absence of limited liability, the principal can implement pure strategy effort and extract
the agent’s gain in future earnings due to accumulated human capital through transfers, by
setting u¯P1 =
ψ
pi − u
(
(1− α) H¯) and uP1 = −u ((1− α) H¯). This yields expected profit:
ΠˆP = y + pi
[
∆ y − g (u¯P1 )]− (1− pi) g (−u ((1− α) H¯))+ α H¯. (14)
In contrast, under a contract that implements a mixed strategy p the principal sets utility
levels u¯M1 = u¯
P
1 =
ψ
pi−u
(
(1− α) H¯) and uM1 (p) = −uM2 (p) = −u((1− α) [H + p (1−pi)1−p pi ∆H]),
yielding expected profit
ΠˆM (p) = y + p pi
[
∆ y − g (u¯P1 )]− (1− p pi) g (uM1 (p))+ α [p H¯ + (1− p)H] . (15)
Implementing a mixed strategy instead of a pure strategy has two effects. First, since 0 >
g
(
uM1 (p)
)
> g
(
uP1
)
, the payment received by the principal in the low-output state decreases
7Creating ambiguity about agents’ types might be optimal for other reasons as well if there are heterogeneous
unexperienced agents (e.g., Koch and Peyrache ((2005a),(2005b))).
8Recall that it is efficient for the agent to exert effort (by Assumption 1).
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(note that the payoff in the high-output state does not change). Second, the probability of a
high- (low-)output state decreases (increases). The overall effect unambiguously decreases the
principal’s profit if the payoff from pure strategy implementation received by the principal in
the high-output state exceeds that received in the low-output state, i.e., if
∆ y − g
(
ψ
pi
− u ((1− α) H¯))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡g(u¯P1 )
> − g (−u ((1− α) H¯))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡g(uP1 )
. (16)
Under this condition the equilibrium contract always implements effort in pure strategies. This
allows us to prove the following result:
Proposition 2
Under unlimited liability of the agent, the principal always induces effort in pure strategies.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that condition (16) is violated (which is a necessary
condition for mixed strategy implementation to be optimal):
− g (−u ((1− α) H¯)) ≥ ∆ y − g(ψ
pi
− u ((1− α) H¯)) (17)
> g
(
ψ
pi
)
− g
(
ψ
pi
− u ((1− α) H¯)) , (18)
where the last relation follows from Assumption 1. Rewriting the last expression we get
g
(
ψ
pi
)
− g
(
ψ
pi
− u ((1− α) H¯)) = ∫ ψpi
ψ
pi−u((1−α) H¯)
g′(q) dq (19)
≥
∫ 0
−u((1−α) H¯)
g′(q)dq = −g (−u ((1− α) H¯)) ,
since g′′(x) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ IR. This leads to a contradiction.
The intuition for the result is clear when the agent is risk neutral. In the absence of limited
liability, the principal can extract the entire rents accruing to the agent in the second period,
e.g., by selling the project to the agent and making him the residual claimant. Pure strategy
effort is optimal because it maximizes the surplus accruing from first-period production and
human capital acquisition.
In the case of a risk averse agent, the principal faces a trade-off between incentives and in-
surance when offering the agent a contract. However, the nature of this trade-off is different
from the standard one in static models since the contract affects incentives indirectly through
market beliefs about the level of effort that the agent exerted and, thus, determines the agent’s
13
wage in the second period. Our result confirms the intuition that the principal does not expose
a risk averse agent to the additional risk associated with mixed strategy effort when she can
make him pay for acquired human capital.9
5 Extensions and alternative interpretations
In the previous sections we derived conditions under which a principal benefits from imple-
menting mixed strategy effort and thereby creating ambiguity about the actions that an agent
has taken. We now consider the robustness of this result in two extensions of the base model:
a pure career concerns setting without explicit contracts, and a setting where contracts are
not observable by outside parties. Then, to illustrate how the base model can be used as
a building block in applications, we present two simple extensions that analyze the issue of
optimal mission focus and optimal screening of job seekers. The latter extension demonstrates
that our main insights do not necessarily require mixing over actions by the agent.
5.1 Pure career concerns
Consider the pure career concerns setting a` la Holmstro¨m (1982/99) where the parties cannot
write output contingent contracts. Since non-contingent wages have no impact on incentives
and the agent is protected by limited liability, first-period wages are optimally set equal to
zero. Clearly, pure strategy effort p = 1 cannot be an equilibrium. Given market beliefs that
p = 1, second-period wages do not respond to first-period output so that the agent’s best reply
is p = 0.
If market beliefs are that the agent exerts no effort or mixed strategy effort, the resulting
second period-utilities are given by equations (7) and (8) from Section 3.2. A pure strategy
no-effort equilibrium (p = 0) exists if and only if the agent’s incentive constraint for p = 0 is
indeed satisfied when the market holds beliefs that p = 0:
u
(
(1− α) H¯)− u2(p = 0) ≤ ψpi . (20)
Since u2(p) is increasing in p the equilibrium then is unique. Note that
9However, mixed strategy implementation can be optimal if the agent’s utility function has a strictly convex
part. Examples can easily be constructed for the case where there exists a minimum utility level so that
u(x) → umin for x → −∞, or when the utility function is convex in losses and concave in gains (e.g., as in
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979)).
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[
u
(
(1− α) H¯)− u2(p)] → 0 for p → 1. Thus, if condition (20) does not hold, there ex-
ists a unique mixed strategy p ∈ (0, 1) sustained by corresponding market beliefs such that
u
(
(1− α) H¯)− u2(p) = ψpi . (21)
This leads to the following result.
Proposition 3
If parties cannot write output-contingent contracts (pure career concerns setting), there exists
no pure strategy effort equilibrium (p = 1). A pure strategy no-effort equilibrium (p = 0)
arises for parameter values satisfying condition (20). Otherwise, the equilibrium involves a
mixed strategy p ∈ (0, 1).
The result demonstrates that mixed strategy effort is not an artefact of the explicit contracts
setting. Career concerns can arise endogenously and sustain mixed strategy effort in equi-
librium because then different levels of output are not equally informative about the agent’s
effort level and thereby about the human capital acquired by the agent. In contrast, pure
strategy effort is only possible with direct monetary incentives since it eliminates uncertainty
about human capital and thereby decouples future wages from the current level of output
produced. The difference from the career concerns mechanism in Holmstro¨m (1982/99) is that
output is not influenced by ability or any other direct measure of the agent’s future produc-
tivity. As a consequence differences in future wages do not arise because output is a signal
about the agent’s ability level (from which the market needs to filter out the effort exerted by
the agent to “jam” this signal) but rather the market tries to learn about the change in the
agent’s human capital due to learning by doing (by inferring from output what effort level was
exerted). Therefore, the two models have different implications about when it is likely that
career concerns induce effort if there are no explicit incentives. In a signal-jamming setting a`
la Holmstro¨m (1982/99) incentives are stronger the more ex ante uncertainty there is about
the level of the agent’s human capital. In our setting, incentives are stronger the bigger the
impact of effort on human capital and the less informative low levels of output are about the
agent’s effort level for any α < 1 (Holmstro¨m (1982/99) considers the case of fully general
human capital, α = 0).
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5.2 Unobservable contracts
Sections 3 and 5.1 demonstrated that mixed strategy equilibria arise in the two cases where
output-contingent contracts are impossible and when output-contingent contracts are observ-
able. We now briefly discuss10 the intermediate case where output-contingent contracts are
feasible but not observable by other outside parties. Since the principal can only credibly
commit to output-contingent wages when contracts are verifiable and enforceable by a court,
either the contract is hard evidence per se that can be directly revealed to outside parties,
or it is possible to send messages to outsiders about the contract that can be verified by the
court which serves as contract enforcer. Thus, without loss of generality, we will assume that
contracts are hard evidence. We modify the timing of the base model by introducing a stage
after (observable) output realizes where each party can unilaterally decide whether or not to
disclose the contractual arrangement to the market before the second-period labor market be-
gins. In such a game, the market holds a set of beliefs about the agent’s effort conditional on
a contract being disclosed as well as a belief if no contract is disclosed. Since high first-period
output is evidence that the agent has accumulated high human capital the second-period wage
is again pinned down by equation (7). Following low-output, one of the contracting parties
will always disclose the true contract. The agent discloses if this leads the market to assign a
higher probability on effort having been exerted than if no contract is disclosed, because this
increases his second-period wage. The principal discloses if this leads the market to assign a
lower probability on effort having been exerted than if no contract is disclosed, because this
decreases the competing wage offers in the second-period labor market. It is therefore easy to
show that pure and mixed strategy equilibria can be constructed as in the base model (now
with the need to specify a suitable set of off-the-equilibrium path beliefs).
5.3 Multiple tasks
In this section we allow for N different tasks, which yield output y˜i ∈ {y, y¯}, i = 1, ..., N
according to the same production technology as in the base model. Through learning by
doing in task i the agent accumulates task-specific human capital Hi that is fully transferable
to other firms interested in this type of human capital. The marketability of task-specific
human capital depends on market forces that are beyond control of the firm and is uncertain.
To capture this, we assume that the value of human capital in task i in the second-period
10A formal derivation of the results is available from the authors.
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labor market is Hi = H¯ xi, where xi is independently distributed according to the uniform
distribution: xi ∼ U [0, 1], i = 1, ..., N . For simplicity, assume that the principal cares only
about the sum of outputs from these tasks in the first period:
Y˜ =
N∑
i=1
y˜i. (22)
For illustrative purposes, we will restrict attention to the simple case where the agent can exert
effort only in a single task. If the principal wants to induce effort in a specific task i, she offers
a contract that defines a clear mission by implementing pure strategy effort in this specific
task. That is, transfers would be t1(yj) = t1(y¯j) = 0 for j ∈ {1, ..., N}, j 6= i, t1(yi) = 0 and
t1(y¯i) = g
(
ψ
pi
)
. In contrast, if the principal wants to create ambiguity about the agent’s human
capital she offers an n-task fuzzy mission contract that rewards the agent based on the sum of
outputs over n ≤ N tasks. For example, if the principal wants to implement effort in one of the
first n tasks in the limited liability case, transfers would be t1 =
 g
(
ψ
pi
)
if
∑n
i=1 yi = y¯
0 if
∑n
i=1 yi = 0
.
Under such a contract the market only imperfectly learns whether effort was exerted on a
specific task or not. If it observes yi = y¯ for some task i, it is clear that the agent exerted
effort on this task and acquired human capital H˜i. Thus, ex ante expected second-period
human capital in the case of high output is H¯/2. In contrast, if the market observes yi = 0,
for all i = 1, ..., N , the market does not know which task was actually pursued and attributes
probability 1/n to each task i = 1, ..., n and probability zero to each task i = n+1, ..., N . The
agent’s best wage offer thus will be
max
i∈{1,...,n}
H˜i
n
. (23)
Taking expectations, ex ante expected second-period human capital in the case of low output
is t2(n) =
n
n+1
H¯
n .
11 Thus, under an n-task fuzzy mission contract the wedge between high and
low output states in terms of expected reputation is given by (n−1)2(n+1) H¯. Since the expected
output for the principal under both types of contracts is the same, and the reputational wedge
is increasing in n, it is optimal for her to set n = N . Thus, it is optimal for the principal to
give the agent complete autonomy of decision over the production process.
Note that in this simple example focus does not matter for production and therefore it is
optimal to maximize reputational incentives. The framework can easily be extended to allow
11This uses the fact that the k-th order statistic in a sample of n observations of the uniform distribution on
[0, 1] follows a Beta distribution with parameters k and n− k + 1.
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for firm-specific human capital and productive gains from focus. Nevertheless, the finding that
fuzzy mission contracts can dominate those that implement a clear mission is interesting, since
it contrasts with the result that obtains in the pure career concerns setting of Dewatripont,
Jewitt, and Tirole (1999b), in which there is no learning by doing. In their model, under some
regularity conditions, a principal always prefers clear missions.
5.4 Screening of job seekers
In this section we address the issue of optimal screening of job seekers by extending the base
model to allow for ex ante uncertainty about agents’ types. In the first period, the principal
has a vacant position to be filled and can hire from a pool of unexperienced job seekers. These
start off with an initial level of human capital normalized to zero and are protected by limited
liability. Once hired by the firm, an agent who does not exert effort produces low output y and
acquires human capital H in the first period. A proportion λ of job seekers is high-skilled, and
can additionally exert unobservable effort at a private cost ψ to increase their unobservable
human capital from H to H¯ through learning by doing. In that case, they produce high
output y¯ with probability pi. The firm has access to a screening technology which provides an
informative signal regarding the types of job applicants with probability q. To set the most
favorable conditions for perfect screening, assume that the principal can choose any probability
q ∈ [0, 1] at no cost. The choice of screening precision is observable by the market.
If the principal adopts the perfect screening technology q = 1, she can distinguish job seekers’
abilities and hires a high-skilled agent. In equilibrium, the market correctly anticipates this
hiring decision and the incentive problem corresponds exactly to the one in Section 3.1. Since
the agent is protected by limited liability, he receives a transfer g(ψpi ) if he produces high output
and 0 otherwise. In contrast, if the principal adopts an imperfect screening technology with
q < 1, she ends up hiring a high-skilled agent with probability q + λ(1 − q) and a low-skilled
agent with probability (1−λ)(1− q). Then, high output provides an agent with a marketable
signal that reveals him to be of high ability and increases his second-period earnings compared
to the situation in which he produces low output and his human capital is uncertain. The
derivation of the optimal screening precision q is similar to the analysis in Section 3.2, replacing
p by q + λ(1− q). Thus, we obtain the following corollary to Proposition 1:
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Corollary 1
If agents are protected by limited liability and the principal has access to a costless screening
technology, then a sufficient condition for imperfect screening (screening precision q < 1) is
given by condition (12), replacing p by q + λ(1− q).
An interesting implication of our result is that the contracts offered by the firm in the first
period are not type contingent. When screening is imperfect, reputational incentives arise
only because contracts do not resolve the ambiguity about the agent’s type. This provides a
rationale for the phenomenon that wages often are less sensitive to differences in individual
characteristics than predicted by incentive theory (e.g., Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstro¨m (1994)).
Our result that a firm might choose not to perfectly screen job seekers even if perfect screening
is costless is reminiscent of Cre´mer (1995). He also shows that a principal might optimally
choose not to acquire information about an agent. The rationale is however different from
ours. In Cre´mer (1995), if the principal were to acquire information about the agent she
would choose to renegotiate and retain an agent who turns out to be of high ability, despite
low performance. Anticipating this, high-ability agents would exert no effort. Thus, choosing
to remain ignorant about an agent’s type allows the principal to credibly dissociate incentives
for effort from the desire to retain high-skilled agents. Stated differently, by committing not
to acquire information on the agent’s true ability, the principal can cut the wage bill. This
is also the effect that we highlight in our paper. Nevertheless, our rationale for limiting the
amount of information that is acquired is different. Committing to an imperfect screening
technology allows the principal to make the beliefs of the market regarding the agent’s human
capital responsive to the output produced. This provides a high-skilled agent with reputational
incentives and permits the principal to cut back on monetary incentives for effort. In sum,
although the benefit side of not acquiring information is the same in both models – a lower
wage bill – the cost side is different: in Cre´mer (1995) the principal takes the risk of firing
(unlucky) high-ability agents; in our setting, there is a decrease in expected output.
Also related is Fingleton and Raith’s (2005) model where the principal voluntarily limits the
amount of information she acquires to affect agents’ mixed strategy choices. A buyer and
a seller (the principals) each delegate the bargaining to agents who are solely motivated by
career concerns. Two different informational settings are compared: an “open-door” process
where principals observe both the actions of agents and the bargaining outcome, and a “closed-
door” process where they only observe the outcome. High-skilled agents can assess the other
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party’s reservation price and always use this information. In contrast, low-skilled agents do
not have this information and engage in inefficient randomization between offers in the open-
door process to mimic high-skilled types. To reduce such inefficiencies, it can be optimal for a
principal to implement the less informative closed-door bargaining process.
6 Conclusion
We show that in a sequential contracting model with moral hazard and learning by doing, a
principal can benefit from implementing mixed strategy effort rather than pure strategy effort
when agents are protected by limited liability. Mixed strategy effort provision gives rise to
reputational incentives that lower the implementation cost for the principal. If these savings
exceed the expected loss in output due to lower effort, the principal implements a contract that
induces mixed strategy effort provision. Moreover, we explore the robustness of this finding
and demonstrate how our base model can be used as a building block to analyze issues such
as mission focus or optimal screening of job applicants. In these extensions we show that it
may be optimal for a principal to be vague on the type of task that an agent should pursue
and delegate completely this decision to the worker. Furthermore, we derive conditions under
which a principal refrains from screening heterogeneous job applicants ex ante, even if perfect
screening is costless.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
This section proves that each contract choice induces a subgame with a unique12 equilibrium.
Contract space
Partition the space of contracts c =
[
t1
(
y
)
, t1 (y¯)
] ∈ IR × IR as follows. Define, for each
p ∈ [0, 1], by Cp the subset of contracts that satisfy the agent’s incentive, individual rationality,
and limited liability constraints for effort p if the agent’s second-period continuation utilities
12To be precise, the equilibrium is unique in the sense that all equilibria implement the same effort and
are payoff equivalent (as in a standard Bertrand competition model many profiles of bidding strategies for
competitors are consistent with equilibrium payoffs ).
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are equal to
u¯p2 = u
(
(1− α) H¯) , (24)
up2 = u
(
(1− α)
[
H +
p (1− pi)
1− p pi ∆H
])
. (25)
Market beliefs
Denote by pˆ the market beliefs about agent’s effort choice p. Then the second-period wages
in the continuation game are
u¯pˆ2 ≡ u(t2(y¯; pˆ)) = u
(
(1− α) H¯) , (26)
upˆ2 ≡ u(t2(y; pˆ)) = u
(
(1− α)
[
H +
pˆ (1− pi)
1− pˆ pi ∆H
])
. (27)
Subgames induced by contracts c ∈ C1
We will show that pure strategy effort p = 1 is the unique equilibrium outcome of such a
subgame. By definition, contracts c ∈ C1 involve first-period wages that induce first-period
utilities u¯c1 ≡ u(tc1(y¯)) and uc1 ≡ u(tc1(y)) which satisfy:
pi
[
u¯c1 + u
(
(1− α) H¯)]+ (1− pi) [uc1 + u ((1− α) H¯)]− ψ ≥ uc1 + u ((1− α) H¯) . (28)
Suppose market beliefs are that the agent exerts pure strategy effort, i.e., pˆ = 1. Then,
inequality (28) is exactly the agent’s incentive constraint. Since c satisfies also the individual
rationality and limited liability constraints, p = 1 is indeed a best response for the agent,
confirming market beliefs.
We now show that c ∈ C1 cannot induce any effort level p 6= 1 in equilibrium. Suppose that
market beliefs are pˆ ∈ (0, 1). Then, given contract c ∈ C1, effort p = pˆ is a best response for
the agent only if
pi
[
u¯c1 + u¯
pˆ
2
]
+ (1− pi)
[
uc1 + u
pˆ
2
]
− ψ = uc1 + upˆ2. (29)
By (26) and (27) we have that for all pˆ ∈ [0, 1) second-period continuation wages satisfy
u¯pˆ2 = u
(
(1− α) H¯) and upˆ2 < u ((1− α) H¯). Therefore, inequality (28) implies that the left-
hand side of (29) is strictly greater than the right-hand side. Hence, the agent’s best response
is p = 1 6= pˆ, leading to a contradiction of market beliefs. Repeating the argument for pˆ = 0
also leads to a contradiction since the only thing that changes is that one needs to replace in
(29) “=” by “<”.
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Subgames induced by contracts c ∈ Cp′ , p′ ∈ [0,1)
Consider some p′ ∈ [0, 1) and contracts c ∈ Cp′ . We will show that mixed strategy effort p = p′
is the unique equilibrium outcome of these subgames. By definition, contracts c ∈ Cp′ induce
first-period utilities u¯c1 and u
c
1 that satisfy:
pi
[
u¯c1 + u
(
(1− α) H¯)]+ (1− pi) [uc1 + u((1− α) [H + p′ (1− pi)1− p′ pi ∆H
])]
− ψ
= uc1 + u
(
(1− α)
[
H +
p′ (1− pi)
1− p′ pi ∆H
])
. (30)
Suppose that market beliefs are pˆ = p′. Then, (30) is exactly the agent’s incentive constraint.
Since c satisfies also the individual rationality and limited liability constraints, p = p′ is indeed
a best response for the agent, confirming market beliefs.
Now we show that c ∈ Cp′ cannot induce any effort level p 6= p′ in equilibrium. Suppose first
that market beliefs are pˆ ∈ (0, 1) 6= p′. Then, given contract c ∈ Cp′ , effort p = pˆ is a best
response for the agent only if (29) is satisfied. Since for all pˆ ∈ (0, 1) 6= p′ we have that u¯pˆ2 = u¯p
′
2
while upˆ2 6= up
′
2 , the constraint is violated and the agent’s best response is either p = 1 or p = 0,
contradicting market beliefs. This rules out equilibria with mixed strategy p ∈ (0, 1) 6= p′.
Now suppose market beliefs are pˆ = 0. Then, given contract c ∈ Cp′ , effort p = pˆ = 0 6= p′ is a
best response for the agent only if
pi
[
u¯c1 + u
(
(1− α) H¯)]+ (1− pi) [uc1 + u02]− ψ ≤ uc1 + u02,
⇔ u¯c1 − uc1 + u
(
(1− α) H¯)− u02 ≤ ψpi (31)
However, the definition of the contract (30) implies that
u¯c1 − uc1 + u
(
(1− α) H¯)− up′2 = ψpi , (32)
so that (31) is violated since up
′
2 > u
0
2 for p
′ ∈ (0, 1). Thus, the agent’s best response is
p = 1 6= pˆ, contradicting market beliefs. This rules out equilibria with pure strategy p = 0 6= p′.
Suppose that market beliefs are pˆ = 1. Then, second-period wages do not respond to the
output and the first-period monetary incentives based on (30) are too weak so that p = 0 6= pˆ
is the agent’s best response, leading to a contradiction. This rules out equilibria with pure
strategy p = 1 6= p′.
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